Filed
June 22, 2000
UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
No.
99-1324
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION;
ANDROGYNY BOOKS, INC. d/b/a A
DIFFERENT LIGHT
BOOKSTORES; AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS
FOUNDATION
FOR
FREE EXPRESSION; ARTNET WORLDWIDE
CORPORATION; BLACKSTRIPE; ADDAZI
INC. d/b/a
CONDOMANIA; ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION;
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION
CENTER; FREE
SPEECH
MEDIA; INTERNET CONTENT COALITION;
OBGYN.NET; PHILADELPHIA GAY NEWS;
POWELL'S
BOOKSTORE; RIOTGRRL; SALON
INTERNET, INC.; WEST
STOCK,
INC.; PLANETOUT CORPORATION
v.
JANET
RENO, in her official capacity as
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES
Appellant
On
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C.
No. 98-cv-05591)
District Judge: Honorable Lowell A.
Reed, Jr.
Argued
Thursday, November 4, 1999
BEFORE:
NYGAARD, McKEE Circuit Judges and
GARTH,
Senior Circuit Judge
(Opinion filed June 22,
2000)
David W.
Ogden
Acting
Assistant Attorney General
Michael R.
Stiles
United
States Attorney
Barbara L.
Herwig
Jacob M.
Lewis (Argued)
Charles
Scarborough
Attorneys,
Appellate Staff
Civil
Division, Room 9120
Department
of Justice
601 D
Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
Attorneys
for Appellant
Douglas A.
Griffin
Christopher R. Harris
Catherine
E. Palmer
Michele M.
Pyle
Katherine
M. Bolger
Latham &
Watkins
885 Third
Avenue
Suite
100
New York,
New York 10022-4802
Christopher A. Hansen
Ann E.
Beeson (Argued)
John C.
Salyer
American
Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad
Street
New York, New
York 10004
Attorneys
for Appellee
American
Civil Liberties Union
2
Stefan
Presser
Christopher A. Hansen
Ann E.
Beeson (Argued)
John C.
Salyer
Suite
701
American
Civil Liberties Union
125 South
Ninth Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107
Attorneys
for Appellees
Androgyny
Books, Inc., d/b/a
A
Different Light Bookstores;
American
Booksellers Foundation
for
Free Expression;
Artnet
Worldwide; Blackstripe;
Addazi,
Inc., d/b/a Condomania;
Electronic
Frontier Foundation;
Electronic
Privacy Information Center;
Free
Speech Media; Internet Content
Coalition;
OBGYN.Net; Philadelphia
Gay
News;
Powell's
Bookstore; Riotgrrl;
Salon
Internet, Inc.; West Stock, Inc.;
Planetout
Corporation
David L.
Sobel
Electronic
Privacy Information
Center
666
Pennsylvania Ave., S.E.
Suite
301
Washington, D.C. 20003
Attorney
for Appellee
Electronic
Privacy Information Center
Shari
Steele
Electronic
Frontier Foundation
6999
Barry's Hill Road
Bryans
Road, Maryland 20616
Attorney
for Appellee
Electronic
Frontier Foundation
3
David
Affinito
Dell'Italia, Affinito, Jerejian
& Santola
18 Tony
Galento Plaza
Orange,
New Jersey 07050
Paul J.
McGeady
Robin S.
Whitehead
Of
counsel
475
Riverside Drive
New York,
New York 10115
Attorneys
for Amici Curiae
Morality
in Media, Inc.
American
Catholic Lawyers
Association
Bruce A.
Taylor
J. Robert
Flores
Chadwicke
L. Groover
National
Law Center for
Children and Families
3819 Plaza
Drive
Fairfax,
Virginia 22030-2512
James J. West
105 North
Front Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101
Attorneys
for Amici Curiae-Appellant
John S.
McCain, Senator; Dan Coats,
Senator;
Thomas J. Bliley,
Representative; Michael G. Oxley,
Representative;
James C. Greenwood,
Representative
Janet M.
LaRue
Family
Research Council
801 G
Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Attorney
for Amicus Curiae-
Appellants
Family Research Council;
Enough is
Enough; The Jewish Policy
Center
4
R. Bruce
Rich
Elizabeth
S. Weiswasser
Weil,
Gotshal & Manges
767 Fifth
Avenue
New York,
New York 10153
Attorneys for Amicus
Curiae-
Appellees
The American Society of
Newspaper
Editors; Bibliobytes, Inc.;
The Center
for Democracy and
Technology; The Comic Book Legal
Defense
Fund; The Commercial
Internet
Exchange Association and
PSINET,
Inc.; Freedom Read
Foundation; Internet Alliance;
Magazine
Publishers of America; The
National
Association of Recording
Merchandisers; People for the
American
Way; Periodical Book
Association; PSINET, Inc.; The
Publishers
Marketing Association; The
Recording
Industry Association of
America;
The Society for Professional
Journalists
Stephen A.
Bokat
National
Chamber Litigation Center
1615 H
St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20062
Bruce J.
Ennis
Jenner
& Block
601 13th
Street, N.W.
12th
Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
Attorney
Amicus Curiae-Appellee
The
Chamber of Commerce of the
United
States of America
5
Bruce J.
Ennis
Jenner
& Block
601 13th
Street, N.W.
12th
Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
Attorney
for Amicus Curiae-Appellee
Internet
Education Foundation
OPINION
OF THE COURT
GARTH,
Circuit Judge:
This
appeal "presents a conflict between one of society's
most
cherished rights -- freedom of expression-- and one
of the
government's most profound obligations -- the
protection of minors." American
Booksellers v. Webb, 919
F.2d
1493, 1495 (11th Cir. 1990). The government
challenges the District Court's
issuance of a preliminary
injunction which prevents the
enforcement of the Child
Online
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. S 231) ("COPA"), enacted in
October
of 1998. At issue is COPA's constitutionality, a
statute
designed to protect minors from "harmful material"
measured by "contemporary community
standards"
knowingly posted on the World Wide
Web ("Web") for
commercial
purposes.1
We will
affirm the District Court's grant of a preliminary
injunction because we are confident
that the ACLU's attack
on
COPA's constitutionality is likely to succeed on the
merits.
Because material posted on the Web is accessible
by all
Internet users worldwide, and because current
technology does not permit a Web
publisher to restrict
access
to its site based on the geographic locale of each
_________________________________________________________________
1. The
District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to
the
general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.S 1331. This
court
exercises appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1), which
provides a court of appeals with
jurisdiction over appeals from
"[i]nterlocutory orders of the
district courts of the United States . . .
granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing, or dissolving injunctions . . .
except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
6
particular Internet user, COPA
essentially requires that
every
Web publisher subject to the statute abide by the
most
restrictive and conservative state's community
standards in order to avoid
criminal liability. Thus, because
the
standard by which COPA gauges whether material is
"harmful to minors" is based on
identifying"contemporary
community standards" the inability
of Web publishers to
restrict access to their Web sites
based on the geographic
locale
of the site visitor, in and of itself, imposes an
impermissible burden on
constitutionally protected First
Amendment
speech.
In
affirming the District Court, we are forced to recognize
that,
at present, due to technological limitations, there may
be no
other means by which harmful material on the Web
may be
constitutionally restricted, although, in light of
rapidly
developing technological advances, what may now
be
impossible to regulate constitutionally may, in the not-
too-distant future, become
feasible.
I.
BACKGROUND
COPA
was enacted into law on October 21, 1998.
Commercial Web publishers subject
to the statute that
distribute material that is harmful
to minors are required
under
COPA to ensure that minors do not access the
harmful
material on their Web site. COPA is Congress's
second
attempt to regulate the dissemination to minors of
indecent material on the
Web/Internet. The Supreme Court
had
earlier, on First Amendment grounds, struck down
Congress's first endeavor, the
Communications Decency
Act,
("CDA") which it passed as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.2See
ACLU v. Reno, 521
U.S.
844 (1997) ("Reno II"). To best understand the current
challenge to COPA, it is necessary
for us to briefly examine
the
CDA.
_________________________________________________________________
2. For
ease of reference the various applicable cases will be referred to
as
follows: ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), hereinafter
"Reno
I" (addressing CDA); ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997),
hereinafter "Reno II" (striking
down the CDA as unconstitutional); ACLU
v.
Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999), hereinafter "Reno III"
(case
currently on appeal addressing
constitutionality of COPA).
7
A.
CDA
The CDA
prohibited Internet users from using the
Internet to communicate material
that, under contemporary
community standards, would be
deemed patently offensive
to
minors under the age of eighteen. See Reno II , 521 U.S.
at
859-60.3 In so restricting Internet users, the CDA
provided two affirmative defenses
to prosecution; (1) the use
of a
credit card or other age verification system, and (2) any
good
faith effort to restrict access by minors. See id. at 860.
In
holding that the CDA violated the First Amendment, the
Supreme
Court explained that without defining key terms
the
statute was unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, the
Court
noted that the breadth of the CDA was "wholly
unprecedented" in that, for
example, it was "not limited to
commercial speech or commercial
entities . . . [but rather]
[i]ts
open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities
and
individuals posting indecent messages or displaying
them on
their own computers." Id at 877.
Further, the Court explained that,
as applied to the
Internet, a community standards
criterion would effectively
mean
that because all Internet communication is made
_________________________________________________________________
3. The
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.S 223(d) provides
that:
Whoever
--
"(1) in
interstate or foreign communications knowingly --
"(A)
uses an interactive computer service to send a specific person
or
persons
under 18 years of age, or
"(B)
uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner
available to a person under 18
years of age, "any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication that, in context,
depicts
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or
organs,
regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call
or
initiated the communication;
or
"(2)
knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
such
person's control to be used for an
activity prohibited by paragraph (1)
with
the intent that it be used for such activity
"shall
be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two
years,
or
both."
8
available to a worldwide audience,
the content of the
conveyed message will be judged by
the standards of the
community most likely to be
offended by the content. See
id. at
877-78. Finally, with respect to the affirmative
defenses authorized by the CDA, the
Court concluded that
such
defenses would not be economically feasible for most
noncommercial Web publishers, and
that even with respect
to
commercial publishers, the technology had yet to be
proven
effective in shielding minors from harmful material.
See id.
at 881. As a result, the Court held that the CDA
was not
tailored so narrowly as to achieve the government's
compelling interest in protecting
minors, and that it lacked
the
precision that the First Amendment requires when a
statute
regulates the content of speech. See id . at 874. See
also
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
2000 WL
646196 (U.S. May 22, 2000).
B.
COPA
COPA,
the present statute, attempts to "address[ ] the
specific concerns raised by the
Supreme Court" in
invalidating the CDA. H.R. REP. NO
. 105-775 at 12 (1998);
See
S.R. REP. NO. 105-225, at 2 (1998). COPA prohibits an
individual or entity
from:
knowingly
and with knowledge of the character of the
material,
in interstate or foreign commerce by means of
the World
Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for
commercial
purposes that is available to any minor and
that
includes any material that is harmful to minors.
47
U.S.C. S 231(a)(1) (emphasis added). As part of its
attempt
to cure the constitutional defects found in the
CDA,
Congress sought to define most of COPA's key terms.
COPA
attempts, for example, to restrict its scope to
material on the Web rather than on
the Internet as a whole;4
to
target only those Web communications made for
"commercial purposes";5 and to
limit its scope to only that
material deemed "harmful to
minors."
_________________________________________________________________
4. COPA
defines the clause "by means of the World Wide Web" as the
"placement of material in a
computer server-basedfile archive so that it
is
publicly accessible, over the Internet, using hypertext transfer
protocol
or any
successor protocol." 47 U.S.C. S 231(e)(1).
5. COPA
defines the clause "commercial purposes" as those
individuals
or
entities that are "engaged in the business of making such
9
Under
COPA, whether material published on the Web is
"harmful to minors" is governed by
a three-part test, each
of
which must be found before liability can attach: 6
(A) the
average person, applying contemporary
community
standards, would find, taking the material
as a whole
and with respect to minors, is designed to
appeal to,
or is designed to pander to, the prurient
interest;
(B)
depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner
patently
offensive with respect to minors, an actual or
simulated
sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or
simulated
normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd
exhibition
of the genitals or post-pubescent female
breast;
and
(C) taken
as a whole, lacks serious, literary, art istic,
political,
or scientific value for minors.
47
U.S.C. S 231(e)(6) (emphasis added).7 The parties
conceded at oral argument that this
"contemporary
community standards" test applies
to those communities
_________________________________________________________________
communications." 47 U.S.C. S
231(e)(2)(A). In turn, COPA defines a
person
"engaged in the business" as one
who makes
a communication, or offers to make a communication,
by means
of the World Wide Web, that includes any material that is
harmful to
minors, devotes time, attention, or labor to such
activities, as a regular course of such person's trade or
business,
with the
objective of earning a profit as a result of such
activities
(although
it is not necessary that the person make a profit or that
the making
or offering to make such communications be the
person's
sole or principal business or source of income).
Id. S
231(e)(2)(B).
6. In
the House Report that accompanied the bill that eventually
became
COPA,
this "harmful to minors" test attempts to conform to the
standards identified by the Supreme
Court in Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S.
629 (1968), as modified by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973)
in
identifying "patently offensive" material.See H.R. REP. NO. 105-775,
at
13
(1998).
7.
Under COPA, a minor is defined as one under age seventeen. See
47
U.S.C.
S 231(e)(7).
10
within
the United States, and not to foreign communities.
Therefore, the more liberal
community standards of
Amsterdam or the more restrictive
community standards of
Tehran
would not impact upon the analysis of whether
material is "harmful to minors"
under COPA.
COPA
also provides Web publishers subject to the statute
with
affirmative defenses. If a Web publisher"has restricted
access
by minors to material that is harmful to minors"
through
the use of a "credit card, debit account, adult
access
code, or adult personal identification number . . . a
digital
certificate that verifies age . . . or by any other
reasonable measures that are
feasible under available
technology," then no liability will
attach to the Web
publisher even if a minor should
nevertheless gain access
to
restricted material under COPA. 47 U.S.C. S 231(c)(1).8
COPA
violators face both criminal (maximum fines of
$50,000
and a maximum prison term of six months, or
both)
and civil (fines of up to $50,000 for each day of
violation)
penalties.9
C.
Overview of the Internet and the World Wide Web
In
recent years use of the Internet and the Web has
become
increasingly common in mainstream society.
Nevertheless, because the unique
character of these new
electronic media significantly
affect our opinion today, we
briefly
review their relevant elements.10
The
Internet is a decentralized, self-maintained
networking system that links
computers and computer
networks around the world, and is
capable of quickly
_________________________________________________________________
8. The
defense also applies if an individual or entity attempts "in
good
faith
to implement a defense" listed above. See id. 47 U.S.C. S
231(c)(2).
9. An
individual found to have intentionally violated COPA also faces
an
additional fine of not more than
$50,000 for each day of violation. See
47
U.S.C. S 231(a)(2).
10. For
more thorough descriptions of the Internet and the Web see
e.g.,
Reno I,
929 F. Supp. 824, 830-45; Reno II , 521 U.S. 844; American
Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.
Supp. 160, 164-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Hearst
Corp. v. Goldberger, 1999 WL 97097 *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997)
(citing
cases).
11
transmitting communications. See
American Libraries Ass'n
v.
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); ACLU v.
Reno,
31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("Reno III").
Even
though the Internet appears to be a "single, integrated
system"
from a user's perspective, in fact no single
organization or entity controls the
Internet. ACLU v. Reno,
929 F.
Supp. 824, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Reno I"); Reno III,
31 F.
Supp.2d at 484. As a result, there is no "centralized
point
from which individual Web sites or services can be
blocked
from the Web." Id. Although estimates are difficult
because
of the Internet's rapid growth, it was recently
estimated that the Internet
connects over 159 countries
and
more than 109 million users. See ACLU v. Johnson,
194
F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999).
The
World Wide Web is a publishing forum consisting of
millions of individual "Web sites"
each containing
information such as text, images,
illustrations, video,
animation or sounds provided by
that site's creator. See
American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at
166. Some of these
Web
sites contain sexually explicit material. See Reno III, 31
F.
Supp.2d at 484. As a publishing forum, the Web is the
best
known method of communicating information online.
See id.
Information is said to be published on the Web as
soon as
it is made available to others by connecting the
publisher's computer to the
Internet. See Reno I , 929 F.
Supp.
at 844; Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 483. Each site is
connected to the Internet by means
of certain protocols that
permit
"the information to become part of a single body of
knowledge accessible by all Web
visitors." American
Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 166;
Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at
483.11
As a part of this unified body of knowledge, Web
_________________________________________________________________
11. A
user who wishes to access the Web resources employs a
"browser."
Browser
software -- such as Netscape Navigator, Mosaic, or
Internet
Explorer -- enables the user to
display, print, and download documents
that
are formatted in the standard Web formatting language. See
American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at
166. The Web"uses a `hypertext'
formatting language called
hypertext markup language (HTML), and
programs that `browse' the Web can
display HTML documents containing
text,
images, sound, animation and moving video stored in many
other
formats. . . . [Hyperlinks] allow
information to be accessed and organized
in very
flexible ways, and allow individuals to locate and efficiently
view
related
information even if the information is stored on numerous
computers all around the world."
Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
12
pages
are all linked together so that the Internet user can
freely
move from one Web page to another by "clicking" on
a
"link." See id. Because the Internet has an
"international,
geographically-borderless
nature,"12 with the
proper
software every Web site is
accessible to all other Internet
users
worldwide. See American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at
166;
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 837; Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d
at
483-84. Indeed, the Internet "negates geometry. . . it is
fundamentally and profoundly
anti-spatial. You cannot say
where
it is or describe its memorable shape and
proportions or tell a stranger how
to get there. But you can
find
things in it without knowing where they are. The
[Internet] is ambient -- nowhere in
particular and
everywhere at once." Doe v. Roe,
955 P.2d 951, 956 (Ariz.
1998).
It is
essential to note that under current technology, Web
publishers cannot "prevent [their
site's] content from
entering any geographic community."
Reno III , 31 F. Supp.
2d at
484. As such, Web publishers cannot prevent Internet
users
in certain geographic locales from accessing their
site;
and in fact the Web publisher will not even know the
geographic location of visitors to
its site. See American
Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 171.
Similarly, a Web publisher
cannot
modify the content of its site so as to restrict
different geographic communities to
access of only certain
portions of their site. Thus, once
published on the Web,
existing technology does not permit
the published material
to be
restricted to particular states or jurisdictions.
D.
Procedural History
On
October 22, 1998, the day after COPA was enacted,
the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") brought the
present
action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, challenging COPA's
constitutionality and seeking to
enjoin its enforcement.13
After
granting a temporary restraining order against
_________________________________________________________________
12.
People v. Barrows, 177 Misc. 2d 712, 729 (NY 1998)
13.
Other parties joined the ACLU in asserting the unconstitutionality
of
COPA.
For ease of reference, we will refer to all party-plaintiffs as
"ACLU"
throughout this
opinion.
13
enforcement of the law on November
20, 1998, the District
Court
held extensive evidentiary hearings which, on
February 1, 1999, resulted in the
entry of a preliminary
injunction preventing the
government from enforcing COPA.
E.
District Court's Findings of Fact
After
five days of testimony, the District Court rendered
sixty-seven separate findings of
fact concerning the
Internet, the Web, and COPA's
impact on speech activity in
this
relatively-new medium. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at
482-92.
It bears noting that none of the parties dispute the
District Court's findings
(including those describing the
Internet and the Web), nor are any
challenged as clearly
erroneous. Thus, we accept these
findings.
The
District Court first rendered findings concerning the
physical medium known as the
Internet, which it
recognized consisted of many
different methods of
communication, only one of which is
the World Wide Web.
See
Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 482-83. It found that "[o]nce
a
provider posts its content on the Internet and chooses to
make it
available to all, it generally cannot prevent that
content
from entering any geographical community." Id.
The
Court then made findings as to the costs and
burdens
COPA imposes on Web publishers and on the
adults
who seek access to sites covered by COPA. See Reno
III, 31
F. Supp. 2d at 482-492. As observed earlier, the
statute
provides for a limited number of defenses for Web
publishers. See 47 U.S.C. S 231(c).
14 The Court found that
_________________________________________________________________
14. The
statute provides:
It is an
affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that
the
defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by minors
to
material
that is harmful to minors --
(A) by
requiring use of a credit card, debit accou nt, adult
access
code, or
adult personal identification number,
(B) by
accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
(C) by any
other reasonable measures that are feas ible under
available
technology.
See 47
U.S.C. S 231(c).
14
as a
technological matter the only affirmative defenses
presently available are the
implementation of credit card or
age
verification systems because there is no currently
functional digital certificate or
other reasonable means to
verify
age. See Reno III. 31 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
With
respect to the credit card option, the court found
that
the cost to Web publishers could range from $300 to
"thousands of dollars" (exclusive
of transaction fees
incurred from each verification).
Id. at 488. These costs
were
also exclusive, according to the court, of the labor and
energy
that would be required of the Web publisher to
implement such a system. Id. This
labor and energy would
include
reorganizing a particular Web site to ensure that
material considered "harmful to
minors" could only be
accessed after passing through a
credit card or other age
verification system. See id. at
490. With this in mind, the
court
found, for example, that textual material that
consisted primarily of non-sexual
material, but also
included some content that was
"harmful to minors" would
also be
subject to such age verification systems. See id.
As for
age verification systems, the District Court's
findings were more optimistic. The
court found that a Web
publisher "can sign up for free
with Adult Check[one
company
providing such a service] to accept Adult Check
PINs,
and a Web site operator can earn commissions of up
to 50%
to 60% of the fees generated by [their] users." Id. at
489.
The District Court also downplayed the cost (both in
price
and in energy) that would be incurred by the
individual seeking to access
"harmful to minors" material
on the
Web, finding that an Adult Check password could be
easily
purchased for only $16.95. See id. at 490.15 The
same
burdens concerning the reorganization of a particular
Web
site mentioned above would, of course, equally apply
to a
Web publisher that elected to utilize a PIN number for
age
verification.
Either
system, according to the District Court, would
impose
significant residual or indirect burdens upon Web
_________________________________________________________________
15. It
now seems that those with a valid credit card who wish to
acquire
an
adult PIN may do so without cost using a Web service such
as
www.freecheck.com.
15
publishers. Most importantly, both
credit card and age
verification systems require an
individual seeking to access
material otherwise permissible to
adults to reveal personal
statistics. Because many adults
will choose not to reveal
these
personal details, those otherwise frequently visited
Web
sites will experience "a loss of traffic." Id. at 491.
This
loss of
traffic, in turn, would inflict "economic harm" upon
the
particular Web site, thus increasing the burden that
COPA
imposes. Id. P 61.
Finally, the District Court
considered whether voluntary
parental blocking or filtering
software was a less restrictive
means
by which to achieve the government's compelling
objective of protecting minors from
harmful material on the
Web.
The court found that "[s]uch technology may be
downloaded and installed on a
user's home computer at a
price
of approximately $40.00." Id. at 492 P 65. The court,
however, acknowledged that such
software "is not perfect"
as it
is both over and under inclusive in the breadth of the
material that it blocks and filters. See i